

## 1 Stable Matching

Consider the set of jobs  $J = \{1, 2, 3\}$  and the set of candidates  $C = \{A, B, C\}$  with the following preferences.

Jobs	Candidates	Candidates	Jobs
1	A > B > C	A	2 > 1 > 3
2	B > A > C	B	1 > 3 > 2
3	A > B > C	C	1 > 2 > 3

Run the traditional propose-and-reject algorithm on this example. How many days does it take and what is the resulting pairing? (Show your work.)

## 2 Propose-and-Reject Proofs

Prove the following statements about the traditional propose-and-reject algorithm.

- (a) In any execution of the algorithm, if a candidate receives a proposal on day  $i$ , then she receives some proposal on every day thereafter until termination.
- (b) In any execution of the algorithm, if a candidate receives no proposal on day  $i$ , then she receives no proposal on any previous day  $j$ ,  $1 \leq j < i$ .

- (c) In any execution of the algorithm, there is at least one candidate who only receives a single proposal. (Hint: use the parts above!)

### 3 Be a Judge

For each of the following statements about the traditional stable matching algorithm with jobs proposing, indicate whether the statement is True or False and justify your answer with a short 2-3 line explanation:

- (a) There is a set of preferences for  $n$  jobs and  $n$  candidates for  $n > 1$ , such that in a stable matching algorithm execution every job ends up with its least preferred candidate.
- (b) In a stable matching instance, if job  $J$  and candidate  $C$  each put each other at the top of their respective preference lists, then  $J$  must be paired with  $C$  in every stable pairing.
- (c) In a stable matching instance with at least two jobs and two candidates, if job  $J$  and candidate  $C$  each put each other at the bottom of their respective preference lists, then  $J$  cannot be paired with  $C$  in any stable pairing.
- (d) For every  $n > 1$ , there is a stable matching instance for  $n$  jobs and  $n$  candidates which has an unstable pairing in which every unmatched job-candidate pair is a rogue couple.

### 4 Universal Preference

Suppose that preferences in a stable matching instance are universal: all  $n$  jobs share the preferences  $C_1 > C_2 > \dots > C_n$  and all candidates share the preferences  $J_1 > J_2 > \dots > J_n$ .

- (a) What pairing do we get from running the algorithm with jobs proposing? Can you prove this happens for all  $n$ ?

(b) What pairing do we get from running the algorithm with candidates proposing?

(c) What does this tell us about the number of stable pairings?